Examples of using Enrichment and reprocessing in English and their translations into Russian
{-}
-
Official
-
Colloquial
A countervailing factor is the possibility that international cooperation facilitates the diffusion of enrichment and reprocessing expertise, thereby increasing the proliferation risks outlined in Chapter 5.1.
The United States has also proposed measures to prevent nuclear proliferation by strengthening controls on enrichment and reprocessing technology.
Such an approach would provide a strong incentive to States to refrain from national enrichment and reprocessing.
used nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be given assurances of access to fuel without the need for enrichment and reprocessing capacities.
countries with an interest in only the peaceful generation of nuclear energy would have no need to pursue enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
States which were not developing a complete fuel cycle should receive guaranteed access to the enrichment and reprocessing markets.
Others argue that economics have meant that there is no need for enrichment and reprocessing MNAs.
It would ensure that verification arrangements were applied to all enrichment and reprocessing facilities in nuclear-weapon-possessing States
Gradually, transparency would be supplemented with IAEA control rights over sensitive technology, enrichment and reprocessing.
other efforts to stem the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities which are of such proliferation sensitivity.
The first proposal was to limit enrichment and reprocessing plants for fissile material to those States currently possessing them.
The focused approach centres on enrichment and reprocessing facilities, on highly enriched uranium
The existing civilian enrichment and reprocessing facilities would eventually operate exclusively through such a nuclear fuel bank.
Any such solution must include permanent cessation of Iran's enrichment and reprocessing efforts and the dismantlement of equipment
the United Kingdom, all civilian enrichment and reprocessing facilities are available for EURATOM and IAEA safeguards.
All enrichment and reprocessing facilities must be placed under multilateral control,
The focused approach concentrates on enrichment and reprocessing facilities and fissile material in downstream facilities.
Of course, commitment of client States to forego enrichment and reprocessing would make such undertakings politically more tolerable.
Other tangible steps included the decision to renounce enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and the recent adoption of a national policy on the evaluation